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Previous research and discussion has suggested that task ambigu­
ity and experimenter-subject familiarity with the task are important 
factors affecting the generality and strength of the experimenter bias 
effect. These factors were conceptualized as inter-task ambiguity 
(inherent in the task) and two types of intra-task ambiguity (experi­
menter's familiarity with the task and subject's familiarity with the 
task). It was hypothesized that experimenter bias would: (1) be a 
significant factor in a more ambiguous task and not a significant fac­
tor in a less ambiguous task, (2) more likely be communicated to the 
subjects who were less familiar with the task, and (3) more likely be 
communicated to the subjects as the experimenters became more familiar 
with the task.
Nine upperclassmen experimenters were randomly assigned to one 
of three bias level, high, medium, and low (expect +5, 0, or -5 mean 
ratings on the person perception task). Each experimenter tested 10 
subjects (female volunteers from introductory psychology) in a random 
order. Five subjects rated high ambiguity photos (mean ratings near 
0 on the success-failure dimension under a no-expectancy condition) 
and five viewed low ambiguity photos (mean ratings high in the success 
direction under the no-expectancy condition).
Five analyses of variance were computed; a significant experi­
menter bias effect was found with the high ambiguity stimilus photos 
but not with the low ambiguity photos. However, the bias levels were
viii
not communicated in the predicted order. The high and low expectancy 
experimenters were both significantly higher than the medium bias expe­
rimenters. The hypotheses pertaining to intra-task ambiguity were not 
supported by the data.
From this study one can conclude that the experimenter bias 
effect is a function of ambiguity inherent in the task. The role of 
intra-task ambiguity is less clear and no conclusion can be stated 




The last 10 years have seen a marked rise of interest in the 
role of the experimenter in psychological research. Psychologists 
have only recently begun to take cognizance of experimenter-subject 
interaction in the social setting of psychological research. McGuigan 
(1963) in an article entitled "The Experimenter: A Neglected Stimulus 
Object" discussed this problem and made a strong case for putting the 
experimenter back in the experimenter-subject interaction.
Experimenters seemingly have accepted research findings without 
due regard to the dangers of what Merton (1948) has called "self- 
fulfilling phophecy." Merton discussed the phenomena of self-fulfilling 
prophecy in relation to minority group stereotypes more than psychologi­
cal research per se, but the conceptualization is readily applicable 
to the latter. He saw researchers and the general public as sometimes 
intentionally, but more often unintentionally affecting situations so 
that they come to reflect the a_ priori hypotheses or prophecies of the 
person. Merton strikingly illustrated this point with an anecdote about 
bank failure. Depositors in a solvent bank caused the bank's failure 
through a mistaken belief in its lack of solvency.
Orne (1962) has discussed at length the problems that have 
developed in the social sciences from using the basic research paradigm 
developed to deal with phenomena in the physical sciences. The problem
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derives from the fact that the physical sciences deal with inanimate 
objects— passive responders. In the social sciences the objects are 
anything but inanimate passive responders. Orne stated that the sub­
jects' motives in the experimental situation, his perception of the expe 
imental situation, and what he is responding to have often been ignored 
or taken for granted in social science research. Orne discussed the 
usual subject in psychological research as being the "good" subject who 
works to please the researcher. The "good" subject sees his task as 
finding out what the experimenter "really" wants and following through 
so as not to upset the experimenter or give him unsatisfactory results. 
The totality of cues which might convey the experimental hypothesis 
to the subject are termed the "demand characteristics" of the situation 
by Orne. These demand characteristics include rumors about the research 
the person of the experimenter, the laboratory setting, and more impor­
tant for the purposes of this study, explicit and implicit communication 
between the experimenter and the subject during the experiment. Where 
the "good" inanimate subject responds ideally to only the experimental 
variables, the animate "good" subject responds to the demand character­
istics of the situation as well as the experimental variables.
Orne and Scheibe (1964) and Raffetto (1967) investigated the 
role of the demand characteristics of the situation in the sensory 
deprivation effect. Orne and Scheibe found significantly more reports 
of hallucinatory experiences and the other usual sensor;.' deprivation 
effects when a "panic button" was available to the subjects and when 
the research was carried out in a medical setting wcLth an "emergency 
tray" present. Raffetto found more reports of hallucinatory experiences
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from the subjects when the experimenters expected them than when the 
experimenters did not expect them. Seemingly the experimenters' 
expectancies were covertly being communicated to the subjects and the 
subjects were responding accordingly in the Raffetto study. The two 
studies successfully showed that the sensory deprivation effect may in 
part be due to the subjects responding to the demand characteristics 
of the situation and not to sensory deprivation per se.
The demand characteristics of the situation are the totality 
of cues available to the subjects. The focus of this study is the 
experimenter and his interaction with the subject. The focus is upon 
the experimenter as in the Raffetto (1967) study more than upon the 
physical aspects of the situation as in the Orne and Scheibe (1964) 
s tudy.
The experimenter variables have been divided into two broad 
classes by Barber and Silver (1968a) and Rosenthal (1966). The first 
class of experimenter variables are the essentially inherent aspects 
of the experimenter such as age, sex, race, status, ethnic character­
istics and personality traits. These aspects of the experimenter have 
been conceptualized as part of the experimenter personal attributes 
effect by Barber and Silver and simply the experimenter effect by 
Rosenthal. These variables, while important in the experimenter- 
subject interaction, are of only indirect interest as control variables 
in this study. The second class of experimenter variables have been 
conceptualized by Barber and Silver and Rosenthal as the experimenter 
bias effect. This effect has at various times been called the exper­
imenter outcome-orientation effect, the experimenter expectancy effect,
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the "Clever Hans Phenomenon," as well as the experimenter bias effect 
by Rosenthal (Barber & Silver, 1968a). This effect is conceptualized 
as being produced by the expectancies, desires or biases of the experi­
menter.
In almost all psychological research the experimenter expects 
or hopes for different responses from different subjects or groups of 
subjects. The experimenter rarely takes specific measures to preclude 
implicit communication of these a priori hypotheses and expectations 
to the subjects. If research hypotheses or expectations are easily and 
often implicitly communicated to subjects, the results of much psycholog­
ical research are open to question. The generality of the experimenter 
bias effect is a very important question for future research as well as 
for the evaluation of past research.
The focus of this paper is on the role of task variables, spe­
cifically the ambiguity of the task, in the occurrence and magnitude 
of the experimenter bias effect. Intuitively, the more ambiguous the 
task, the more likely the experimenters' biases will be a factor in 
determining the subjects' responses.
CHAPTER II
HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The literature pertaining to unintended experimenter effects 
is very rich and diverse. Indirectly relevant information could be 
included from many areas. The literature review will be limited as 
much as possible, to directly relevant studies which utilize standard­
ized treatment and assessment procedures. This has the effect of 
reducing the scope of this study to the experimenter bias effect as 
discussed and investigated by Rosenthal (1966). Studies not based on 
this paradigm are to be included only if directly relevant to the 
emphasis on task variables.
The concept of unintended experimenter effects broadly defined 
has been of major interest to clinicians and psychotherapists (Goldstein, 
1962; Troffer and Tart, 1964), educators (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968) 
and survey interviewers (Ferber and Wales, 1952). Typically, researchers 
in these areas have not used standardized procedures. In the Rosenthal 
and Jacobson (1968) study, for instance, elementary school teachers were 
led to believe that certain students had unusual potential for intellec­
tual growth while others were only average. Standard treatment proce­
dures were lacking in that the teachers were permitted to treat the 
children differently.
Several additional lengthy reviews of the general literature 
dealing with unintentional experimenter effects are available. These
5
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include a book-length treatment by Friedman (1967) , a lengthy doctoral 
dissertation by Fode (1967), a journal review by Kintz, Delprato, Mettee, 
Persons and Schappe (1965), and numerous journal articles by Rosenthal 
(1963, 1964a, 1964b, 1967a, 1969). The prime source in the area is a 
book entitled "Experimenter Effects in Behavioral Research" by Rosenthal 
(1966). Recent more specialized review articles in the area include 
one by Silver (1968) on experimenter modeling and one by Glixman (1967) 
on effects of examiner, examiner-sex and subject sex upon categorizing 
behavior.
Seemingly the earliest study dealing specifically with unintended 
experimenter effects in a straightforward experimental task was one done 
by Stanton and Baker in 1942. Stanton and Baker presented 12 nonsense 
geometric figures to 200 undergraduate subjects. Retention of these 
figures was measured by five experienced workers some time after the 
presentation session. The experimenters were given keys which contained 
correct responses but also some incorrect responses. The experimenters 
were explicitly warned to avoid any bias associated with having the keys 
before them while interviewing the subjects. Stanton and Baker found 
that what the subjects retained tended to be in agreement with what the 
experimenters believed to be correct. The subjects significantly more 
often gave correct responses when the experimenter had the correct key 
than when the experimenter's key was incorrect.
Lindzey (1951) replicated the Stanton and Baker study, but empha­
sized to his experimenters to keep the key out of sight from the subjects. 
The results failed to confirm the Baker and Stanton findings. Friedman 
(1942) also failed to obtain the statistical significance obtained in the
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original study. Stanton (1942) strengthened the conclusions stated in 
the original Stanton and Baker (1942) study. The responses expected by 
experimenters were found more often than expected by chance. Seemingly, 
the experimenters were cueing the subjects to what was expected or record­
ing what they expected to hear in the subject's responses.
Most of the recent work on unintended experimenter effects has 
been based on Rosenthal's (1966) person-perception task. The subject 
is shown a series of photographed faces and is asked to rate each on a 
scale ranging from -10 to +10 whether the person has been experiencing 
failure or success. The subject is instructed to rate a +10 for extreme 
success and a -10 for extreme failure with intermediate labeled points.
The photographs were originally standardized by administering them under 
a "no-expectancy condition" to a large sample of undergraduate students. 
The photographs selected for presentation to the experimental groups 
averaged near zero under the no-expectancy condition. Typically the 
subjects and experimenters were students. Before seeing the student 
subjects, the student experimenters were usually told to expect subject 
ratings to average +5 or -5. The student experimenters were also led 
to believe that they were replicating "well established findings."
In the first experiment based on this paradigm (Rosenthal, 1966)
10 advanced undergraduates and graduate students of psychology served 
as experimenters. Each student experimenter was assigned about 20 sub­
jects from an introduction to psychology course. The 10 photos used 
as stimulus items had a mean no-expectancy rating near zero. Half the 
student experimenters were told that people generally rated the photos 
as moderately successful (ratings of +5) and half the experimenters were 
told that people generally rated the photos as moderately unsuccessful
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(ratings of -5). The rest of the instructions given to the experimenters 
were the same for both groups. They were given identical instructions 
to read to their subjects and all were cautioned not to deviate from 
these instructions. The experimenters were told that they were partici­
pating in the study to see how well they could duplicate "well established 
findings."
According to Rosenthal (1966) and Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) 
the results were clear. The experimenters that expected higher average 
ratings found significantly higher average ratings. Two replications 
were conducted which confirmed the original findings. The experimenters 
tended to obtain the results that they expected to obtain.
Subsequent research reported by Rosenthal (1966) and his asso­
ciates dealt with the generality of the phenomena, mediating variables, 
and parametric studies involving experimenter variables. The results 
seemed clear to Rosenthal (1963) as he stated that the experimenter 
expectancy effect is "both a fairly general and fairly robust phenom­
enon" (p. 271).
Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) in discussing the individual dif­
ferences among experimenters stated:
Those experimenters who show greater self-fulfilling effects 
of prophecies tend to be of higher status in the eyes of their 
subjects, and they conduct their experiments in a more profes­
sional, more competent manner. They are more likeable and more 
relaxed, particularly in their movement patterns, while avoiding 
an overly personal tone of voice that might interfere with the 
business at hand (p. 28).
Friedman, Kurland, and Rosenthal (1965) also discussed what they called 
"professionalness" as a factor in experimenter bias communication. The 
Friedman, Kurland and Rosenthal article was based on the examination of 
moving pictures of experimenter-subject interactions.
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Rosenthal's statements about the generality of experimenter bias 
have recently been criticized in a series of articles by Barber and bis 
associates (Barber, 1969; Barber & Silver, 1968a, 1968b; Barber, Cal- 
verly, Forgione, McPeake, Chavis, & Bowen, 1969). Barber and bis asso­
ciates criticized the earlier studies in the area on the basis of the 
statistical analyses used. They pointed out that many of the studies 
(seemingly the majority of them) did not clearly demonstrate the exper­
imenter bias effect. The faults in the analyses of results included 
failure to perform an overall statistical analysis to exclude the null 
hypothesis and failure to avoid "probability pyramiding" when postmortem 
tests were performed. Barber and Silver (1968a) concluded that "the 
experimenter bias effect appears to be more difficult to demonstrate 
and less pervasive than was implied" (p. 23). They also felt that in 
some studies purporting to show the effect the student experimenters 
misjudged, misrecorded or misreported the results. Some studies they 
analyzed did show the experimenter bias effect, however.
Rosenthal (1968) defended his earlier conclusions. The defense 
was based on combining the probabilities from 12 studies which showed 
the experimenter bias effect. The combined probability was less than 
1/1,000,000. Rosenthal held that analyzing results of single experi­
ments as Barber and his associates had done was a misleading procedure. 
He stated that the studies should be viewed as a run of experiments and 
the combined probability for the 12 studies was only 1/1,000,000 that 
the results were a chance happening.
Rosenthal (1969) also criticized the Barber et al. (1969) fail­
ures to replicate the findings of the earlier Rosenthal studies.
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Rosenthal felt that the Barber _et_ al. studies could not be regarded as 
serious attempts to replicate because of differences in experimenters 
and subjects from his studies.
Other recent studies based on the Rosenthal paradigm have also 
failed to replicate the original findings. Jacob (1968) included a 
zero expectancy control group and directly probed the subjects' per­
ception of the experimenters' expectancies. The overall based on 
the subjects' mean ratings of the photos was not significant (J?<1.0). 
The +5 subjects, when directly asked, thought that their experimenters 
expected a mean of .38, the -5 subjects a mean of 1.17, and the zero 
expectancy control group thought that their experimenters expected a 
mean of 3.04. The _t between the +5 group prediction of experimenter 
expectancy and the zero group was significant; the other jts were not 
significant. Jacob concluded: "Coupled with the Barber and Silver 
conclusions (Barber & Silver, 1968a), the present findings indicates 
that assuming the stability of the effect and focusing on particular 
modes of mediation is rather premature, and it is suggested that sub­
sequent research be directed toward specification of conditions under 
which the effect actually emerges" (p. 240). Another recent study 
(Kennedy, 1969) also failed to detect the Rosenthal effect in a verbal 
conditioning task. Kennedy's experimenters were given more extended 
pretask indoctrination than is usual; the author thought that this 
might have been a factor that attenuated the effect.
Verbal Mediation
Verbal communication seems very important in the experimenter 
bias effect. Adair and Epstein (1968) and Epstein (1966) reported on
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a study in which verbal cues alone were sufficient for communication 
of the experimenters' expectations. Six male student experimenters 
administered the basic person-perception task to 60 female student 
subjects. Each experimenter ran five subjects under the low expect­
ancy (-5) condition and five under the high expectancy (+5) condition. 
The reading of the instructions was tape recorded during theses sessions 
and 60 more female subjects run using only the tape recorded voice as 
the experimenter. A significant experimenter bias effect was found in 
both the visual and non-visual situations. The voice of the experi­
menter reading the instructions seemingly was enough to communicate the 
expectancies to the subjects.
Fode (1960, Rosenthal & Fode, 1963) also indicated the great 
importance of verbal cues in experimenter bias communication. Fode 
restricted experimenter-subject visual contact in one group and the 
experimenters' verbal communication in a second group and compared 
the subjects' performance in these groups with conditions in which 
there were no restrictions. Fode concluded that while verbal cues 
are sufficient to mediate experimenter bias, visual cues increased the 
effect.
Intra-task and Inter-task Ambiguity
Ambiguity can be conceptualized as being of two kinds. The 
first type, intra-task ambiguity, refers to differences in ambiguity 
in one task over time. For example, a task completely new to an exper­
imenter and subject would be more ambiguous than a very familiar task.
As the initially unfamiliar task becomes more familiar over the course 
of the study the ambiguity would decrease. Intra-task ambiguity for a
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subject would be less on later pictures in the person-perception task 
than on earlier pictures. For the experimenter intra-task ambiguity 
would be less with subjects seen later in the study than with subjects 
seen earlier in the study. .
Inter-task ambiguity refers to characteristics of the task
itself. Some tasks are just more ambiguous than others. Riecken (1962)
suggested that there are two general types of experimental tasks "that
provide subjects with different kinds of hints as to how to put their
best foot forward, or, in effect, urge subjects to adopt one or another
'set' toward the experiment" (p. 35). He called one type "task ability"
and the other "self-quality." Riecken stated that:
A "task-ability" set is characteristically adopted when the 
experimenter presents the work to be done as involving some 
ability, skill or capacity to perform. The task may be motor 
or mental, simple or complex, familiar or strange, e.g. estimat­
ing the number of dots on a card, judging "auto-kinetic" move­
ment distances, judging the personality of another or solving 
"human relations problems." The outstanding feature of such 
assignments is that there is no upper limit on the amount of 
skill or capacity the subject "ought" to display (p. 35).
In task-ability problems the positively valued end of the ability con­
tinuum is generally known to the subjects. The subject usually works 
to his limit in the task; it is impossible for him to do more than his 
best. The subject can misrepresent his performance in only one direc­
tion and that is to do less than he is capable of doing.
The self-quality problems are quite different according to 
Riecken. They "can be characterized in general as being concerned with 
opinions and beliefs; with responses to frustration, insult, and failure; 
with conformity-independence, choice-rejection or others; or with qual­
ities such as dogmatism, authoritarianism, punitiveness and the like"
(p. 35). In general the self-quality tasks are more open-ended, more
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ambiguous than the task-quality problems according to Riecken. The 
task-quality problems involve one dimension of "good-bad" performance 
while the self-quality problems "tend to have two bad extremes and a 
good point located somewhere between the extremes, though not neces­
sarily in the 'middle'" (p. 36). In order to be a "good" subject in 
a self-quality task the "subject must either draw from his pool of 
common sense knowledge about what 'anybody knows' . . .  or . . .  he 
would have to know the scheme of relevance that the experimenter is 
employing: the hypothesis being tested, the categories into which
the behavior will be placed, the criteria for such placement, and the 
value assigned to category" (p. 36). Generally the experimenter con­
ceals this information from the subject and this tends to "maximize 
the negotiation" between subject and experimenter. The person- 
perception task generally used in the area of experimenter bias would 
be considered a self-quality situation.
Intra-task Ambiguity
The experimenter's experience with a particular task seems to 
be a relevant variable in the experimenter's performance. Brogden 
(1962) reported that naive experimenters differed in the speed with 
which they conditioned rabbits but that the initial differences dis­
appeared as the experimenters became more experienced. Cordaro and 
Ison (1963) in a study of observer bias in classical conditioning of 
the planaria stated that while a significant bias effect was found, 
it was to be attributed to experimenters using different response 
criteria. The experimenters were given little information as to when 
a response shjould be recorded as a response. Shinkman and Kornblith
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(1965) suggested that the degree of observer bias is not as great with 
more experienced experimenters. Rosenthal and Halas (1962) reported 
that even experienced researchers showed significant differences when 
asked to record turning responses and contraction responses in planaria 
under a no-false expectancy condition. However, the "experienced" 
researchers in the Rosenthal and Halas study were not particularly 
experienced in the area of observing planarian behavior. The differ­
ences may have been less if the response criteria had been more strin­
gently defined and the experimenters had been given more training. The 
task of planaria observing may be just too ambiguous for human observers 
to perform reliably. Cordaro and Ison (1963) suggested that cameras be 
used to more objectively record planarian responses.
Ingraham and Harrington (1966) required 27 initially naive 
experimenters to condition "dull" and "bright" rats in a bar-press 
task. The rats were actually randomly assigned to the student exper­
imenters. The authors reported no significant overall experimenter 
bias effect but found evidence to indicate that early trials showed 
some bias effect. They concluded that the bias present was an initial 
response and not a continuing response in a decreasingly ambiguous 
situation. Other factors pointed out as possibly having a role in 
attenuating the experimenter bias effect were the relatively long 
experimenter pretraining period and the fact that the experimenters 
were given mixed expectancies. The individual experimenters were 
led to expect different performances from different rats. Ingraham 
and Harrington suggested that bias is more often shown where the 
experimenter is given only one expectancy instead of mixed expectancies.
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Rosenthal (1967b, 1967c) reanalyzed the data from the Ingraham 
and Harrington (1966) study and suggested that the results did demon­
strate experimenter bias. The authors responded (Harrington, 1967; Har­
rington & Ingraham, 1967) to Rosenthal's criticisms. They defended their 
original conclusions and questioned Rosenthal's analysis of the data.
They restated their original conclusion that the bias shown was an initial 
but not a continuing response in a decreasingly ambiguous situation.
Two studies based on the person-perception task indicate that 
the bias effect is operating on the earliest photos of a subject's 
trials. Rosenthal, Fode, Vikan-Kline, and Persinger (1964) looked at 
the temporal aspects of bias communication in three earlier studies. In 
general, they found that the magnitude of the expectancy effect was some­
what greater for the first photo alone, than for all ten photos combined. 
The subjects seemed to be somewhat more affected by the experimenters' 
bias on earlier trials when the task was relatively unfamiliar than on 
later trials when the task was more familiar. The tendency for the 
experimenter bias effect to decrease over the series of photos was more 
strikingly shown, in a study by Weick reported by Rosenthal (1966) . Weiclc 
required two experimenters to administer the person-perception photo 
rating task to 10 introductory psychology students. One of the experi­
menters presented the cards to five subjects under a high bias expect­
ancy and the second experimenter saw the other five students under a low 
bias expectancy. The experiment was conducted in front of Weick's class 
in experimental social psychology. The subjects rated the photos dif­
ferently (_t = 2.93, £ = .01, one-tail) in line with the experimenters' 
biases, but the first responses were more affected than were the sub­
sequent responses. The bias effect was significant on the very first
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photo but diminished significantly = .08) for the last 10 photos of 
the standard 20-photo set.
In the Weick study, the effect of subjects' intra-task ambigu­
ity, conceptualized as familiarity, is clearly shown. As the ambiguity 
of the task decreased through increasing familiarity, the subjects 
showed significantly less experimenter bias effect. The mean ratings 
of the subjects being tested by the high bias experimenter tended to 
approach the mean ratings of the subjects being tested by the low bias 
experimenter.
There is very little research that is directly relevant to the 
question of the role of the experimenter's experience in the communi­
cation of the experimenter's expectancies involving the person-perception 
task. Vikan-Kline (1962) in an investigation of the effect of the exper­
imenter's perceived status on the mediation of experimenter bias found 
no order effect among her lower status experimenters but did find an 
order effect among her higher status experimenters. The higher status 
experimenters showed a significant tendency (g_ = .01) to influence sub­
jects seen later in the study more than subjects seen earlier in the 
study. Rosenthal (1966) discussed the effect as learning to communi­
cate unintentionally. He concluded that "although the evidence is not 
conclusive, it does seem that, on the whole, later-contacted subjects 
are more influenced by the experimenter's expectancy than earlier- 
contacted subjects" (p. 301-302).
Inter-task Ambiguity
Many authors have suggested that the ambiguity of the task is
an important factor controlling the generality of the experimenter bias
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effect. As Barber and Silver (1968a) put it: "The hypothesis suggested 
. . .  is that the effects of experimenter's expectancies on the results 
of his research vary directly with the ambiguity, lack of structure, or 
non-factualness of the experimental task. Further research is needed to 
test this hypothesis" (p. 26). Masling (1966) strongly emphasized the 
importance of task ambiguity: "The stimulus variable is crucial. The 
more clearly the stimulus can be perceived, the less opportunity for pro­
jecting experimenter or S (subject) bias" (p. 92}, Shames and Adair (1967) 
also discussed task ambiguity: "the type of task is a critical factor 
limiting the generality of experimenter-bias effects" (p. 6). Ambiguity 
has also been discussed in the context of interviewer bias. Ferber and 
Wales stated that "interviewer bias is more likely to crop up on atti- 
tudinal questions than on questions of fact" (1952, p. 116).
While many persons have talked about the role of ambiguity in 
experimenter bias, few studies have dealt with ambiguity per se. As 
one would expect, however, those tasks that are more fact oriented seem 
not to show the experimenter bias effect as often as the more attitude- 
oriented tasks.
Ekren (1962) studied the effect of experimenter bias on a rela­
tively unambiguous task, the block design segment of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale. The block design task would be of the fact- 
oriented type (Ferber & Wales, 1952) or the task-ability type (Riecken, 
1962). No significant experimenter bias effect was found. Pflugrath 
(1962) found no overall significant experimenter bias effect in a stan­
dardized paper and pencil test, the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. The 
scale was administered to groups of subjects, however, so experimenter- 
subject interaction was minimal. Pflugrath concluded that "Examiner bias
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in the group testing situation is probably not a particularly robust 
phenomenon" (p. 33). The questions on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety 
Scale tend to be of the fact-oriented type; the bias effect may be a 
factor only in individual testing situations, if at all.
The ink-blot projective tests seem to serve as ready vehicles 
for the demonstration of experimenter bias. Masling (1965) required 
14 graduate student volunteers for a quick course in Rorschach technique 
to administer the cards to undergraduates. The experimenters were led 
to expect different results. Half were told that experienced experimenter 
found more human than animal responses on the Rorschach task; the other 
seven experimenters were told the opposite— experienced experimenters 
found more animal than human responses. The data were in agreement *tfith 
the induced expectancies. Marwit and Marcia (1967) based their study on 
achromatic reproductions of Holtzman ink blots. Undergraduate psychology- 
major experimenters administered the task to introductory psychology- 
student subjects. One group of experimenters formulated their own expect­
ancies about the number of responses the subjects would give to the 
stimulus cards. The members of the second group were differentially indoc­
trinated. Some were led to expect many responses while others were led 
to expect few responses. The experimenters tended to get the results 
they expected, even when the expectancy was self induced as with the first 
group of experimenters. The authors concluded that "Bias (was) found to 
be an especially strong phenomenon" (p. 253). Strauss (1968), however, 
found no significant experimenter bias effect in the Rorschach ink-blot 
task. Strauss stated that "E (experimenter) expectance does not appear 
to affect a centrally significant Rorschach variable in a personality 
assessment situation" (p. 129). The variable in question was movement
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domination or color domination of the movement to color ratios in the 
responses. The crucial difference between the Strauss study and the 
preceding two was that Strauss attempted to approximate a "real-life" 
assessment situation. The graduate student experimenters had completed 
a full course in projective techniques. The experimenter expectancies 
were not specifically induced as in the two preceding studies and the 
experimenters had different expectancies for different subjects. One 
must conclude that while the ink-blot projective tests can be readily 
used to demonstrate the experimenter bias effect, the effect is probably 
less powerful, less general in actual personality-assessment situations.
Shames and Adair (1967) studied the effect of type of task on 
the experimenter bias effect. The first task was the person-perception 
problem and the second, a more fact-oriented task, involved estimating 
the number of dots on a card. The person-perception task was a repli­
cation of the basic Rosenthal paradigm. Some of the student experimenters 
were led to expect judgments of success (+5) from their student subjects, 
and the rest were led to expect judgments of failure (-5). The experi­
menters were led to believe that they were replicating "well-established 
findings." The numerosity estimation task required the subjects to 
estimate how many dots were on each of 10 stimulus cards. The individual 
cards contained 200 dots. One group of experimenters expected over­
estimates (average 210 rating) and the second group expected under­
estimates (average 190 rating). A significant experimenter bias effect 
was found on the person-perception task, but not on the less ambiguous 
numerosity estimation task.
Weiss (1967, 1969) attempted to vary task ambiguity by varying 
tachistoscopic exposure time of 15 slides containing differing numbers
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of dots (7 to 10 per slide). For high ambiguity the exposure time was 
•1 second, for moderate ambiguity .5 second, and for low ambiguity 5 
seconds. The volunteer student experimenters were divided into three 
groups and given different expectancies. One group expected the sub­
jects to underestimate, the second group expected average estimates, 
and the third group expected overestimates. A basic problem found was 
that all subjects underestimated the number of dots when the exposure 
time was shortest, .1 second. No firm conclusions can be drawn from 
the studies.
Wessler (1968, 1969; Wessler & Strauss, 1968) explored the 
relationship of the experimenter bias effect to various types of tasks.
In general, no strong experimenter bias effect was found in any of the 
tasks studied. One of the tasks was the original Rosenthal person- 
perception task. In two attempts to replicate the original findings no 
significant experimenter bias effect was found. In the first attempt 
the results were in the opposite direction from what was expected; in 
the second, the results were in the predicted direction but not statis­
tically significant. No significant experimenter bias effect was 
found in a reaction time study either. The reaction time task would 
be considered a task-ability situation (Riecken, 1962). In a compar­
ative study of three different tasks, person-perception, judging of 
line lengths, and the tapping of dots into circles, no overall signif­
icant experimenter bias effect was found. The tasks were selected on 
the basis of decreasing ambiguity. The person-perception task was 
thought to be most ambiguous, the judging of line lengths of moderate 
ambiguity, and the dot tapping task of least ambiguity. While no overall 
significant bias effect was found on any of the tasks, subjects showing
21
bias in the predicted direction on the most ambiguous task, the person- 
perception task, were significantly biased on the moderately ambiguous 
task but not significantly biased on the least ambiguous task, Wessler 
concluded that "These trends are congruent with the hypothesis that the 
more obvious the correct response is to (subject), the less suscep­
tible S_'s (subject's) performance is to _E (experimenter) expectancy 
effects, probably because need not seek information about how his per­
formance will be evaluated by 12 " (1969, p. 66).
Masling and Rabie (Masling, 1966) studied the effect of varying 
the ambiguity of the stimulus items within a person-perception situation. 
From a pool of 70 high school class pictures two sets of seven pictures 
were chosen to serve as the stimulus items. The pictures were selected 
on the basis of perceived attractiveness as judged by female subjects. 
While the two groups of pictures had the same mean attractiveness, they 
varied considerably in homogeneity. One group was fairly homogeneous; 
the pilot subjects were in fairly good agreement about the degree of 
attractiveness displayed. The second group of pictures showed much more 
variability in judged attractiveness. The low variability photos were 
less ambiguous than the high variability set of photos. The experi­
menters were told that the task was designed to study the relationship 
between the self-concept of freshman female subjects with the ratings 
of attractiveness the subjects would assign to the photos. Half of the 
experimenters were told that their subjects were high in self-concept, 
would show good acceptance of others, and therefore tend to give high 
attractiveness ratings. The other half of the experimenters, a control 
group, were given no expectancies. The experimental hypothesis was that 
the subjects in the experimental group would show a significant
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difference between the two sets of stimulus items; the more ambiguous 
items would show biased ratings, be rated more attractive. The control 
group would show no significant difference. The results of the study 
were in the predicted direction but did not attain statistical signif­
icance.
Recapitulation
Several studies involving animal subjects (Brogden, 1962;
Cordaro & Ison, 1963; Ingraham & Harrington, 1966; Rosenthal & Halas, 
1962; Shinkman & Kornblith, 1965) have presented evidence that an 
experimenter's or observer's familiarity with a task is a factor in his 
performance. The general tenor of the conclusions was that less experi­
enced researchers were more likely to bias their results in animal 
studies. Very little research has been done on the role of the experi­
menter's experience involving the person perception task. Vikan-Kline 
(1962) and Rosenthal (1966) suggested that more experienced experimenters 
are more likely to display a bias effect on the person perception task.
The general conclusion about a subject's performance relative 
to his experience seems to be that as a subject becomes more familiar 
with a particular task he tends to be less affected by the experimenter's 
expectancy. This tentative conclusion was supported by research con­
ducted by Rosenthal, Fode, Vikan-Kline, and Persinger (1964) and Weick 
(Rosenthal, 1966).
Several authors have suggested that inter-task ambiguity is an 
important factor in the experimenter bias effect (Masling, 1966; Weis, 
1967, 1969; Wessler, 1968, 1969; Shames & Adair, 1967; Wessler & Strauss, 
1968). Only one of the authors, Masling (1966) attempted to vary
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inter-task ambiguity within the person perception task; the results 
were inconclusive.
Statement of the Problem
This study will investigate the role of inter-task ambiguity 
and intra-task ambiguity in the experimenter bias effect. Past studies 
have suggested that task ambiguity is a crucial factor limiting the 
generality of the experimenter bias effect. Past studies have also 
suggested the importance of intra-task ambiguity. As experimenters 
and subjects become more familiar with a task their responses change; 
previous studies have led to tentative conclusions about these changes.
Hypotheses
1. The experimenter bias effect is a function of inter-task 
ambiguity.
2. The experimenter bias effect is a function of intra-task 
ambiguity.
a. The experimenter bias effect decreases as a function 
of the subjects' increasing familiarity with a partic­
ular task.
b. The experimenter bias effect increases as a function 





Two groups of 10 photos selected from an initial pool of 63 were 
used in this study. The initial pool of photos, taken from weekly news 
magazines, included both known and relatively unknown persons. In the 
eyes of the author, the initial pool of photos sampled all points of 
the success-failure dimension in terms of facial expression, reputation, 
clothing, and pictured background. '
The initial pool of 63 photos were shown by the author to 27 
female volunteers from the introduction to psychology class in individ­
ual sessions under a no-expectancy condition. The pilot study subjects 
were asked to rate the photos on a 20-point scale (-10, extreme failure, 
to +10, extreme success, with no 0 point) as to the degree of success or 
failure that the pictured person was experiencing. To insure against 
expectancy communication between the author and the pilot subjects, the 
author avoided looking at which particular photo the subject was view­
ing and recorded results by noting a randomly assigned identification 
number on the back of the photo. The pilot photos were shuffled 
between subjects to avoid serial effects.
The two groups of 10 photos selected for use in the study were 
chosen on the basis of the no-expectancy mean ratings. The photos 
selected for the high ambiguity group had mean ratings near 0, the
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neutral point. Ratings of success-failure for these tended to vary 
symmetrically about the mean rating. Photos selected for the low 
ambiguity group were those with the highest mean ratings. The ratings 
of these high success photos were less free to vary due to the +10 
ceiling for ratings. It was thought that the highly rated photos would 
be a problem more of recognition that attitude for raters while the 
photos rated near the neutral point would represent more of an attitude- 
oriented problem. The highly rated photos tended to be relatively well 
known persons such as Nixon, Dustin Hoffman, Johnny Carson, and Dick 
Cavett; the high ambiguity group tended to be relative unknowns. A sec­
ond difference between the groups was that the persons pictured in the 
low ambiguity photos tended to have more "smiley" expressions; the pic­
tures with means near the neutral point, in the eyes of the author, had 
expressions that were much more enigmatic.
The mean ratings and standard deviation of the photos are con­
tained in Table 11 of Appendix B. As can be seen from the table, the 
photos selected for the more ambiguous set had mean ratings of from -.9 
to +.9 while the mean ratings of photos selected for the relatively 
unambiguous set ranged from +6.1 to +8.2. The SDs for the ambiguous 
photos tended to be larger than the SDs for the unambiguous photos.
The mean SI) for the ambiguous photos was 4.29 and the mean HD for the 
unambiguous photos was 3.16.
The selected photos were mounted on 8 x 7 inch tabbed pieces of 
cardboard and placed in individual slots in an accordian-type expanding 
folder. The pictures were randomly ordered to guard against having all 





better identifications were written on the tabbed portions
Experimenters
The experimenters were nine male volunteers from the abnormal 
psychology class. All nine were psychology majors in their junior or 
senior year of study. In soliciting for volunteers, the author stated 
that the study involved research on "empathy." The volunteers would get 
actual research experience as research assistants. As a further induce­
ment to volunteer, the students were told that if the research turned 
out well, it would be published with the volunteer research assistants' 
names in a footnote. The students that volunteered were asked to wear 
coat and tie for the actual study.
Subjects
The subjects were 90 female volunteers from the introduction to 
psychology class. Volunteers were solicited through recitation instruc­
tors. Women students were asked to volunteer for a "picture" study that 
would take only 10-15 minut .■•> of their time. They were asked to sign up 
for one of nine experimental sessions scheduled an hour and a half apart 
(6:30, 8:00, and 9:30) on three succeeding evenings. It was found to 
be quite difficult to get volunteers for the 9:30 sessions. The author 
had to call students personally to get enough volunteers for that time 
slot. Each volunteer was called shortly before her schedule time to 
remind her of when and where the study was scheduled.
Procedure
The nine student experimenters were randomly assigned to one of 
three bias conditions, low bias (expect -5 mean ratings), neutral bias
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(expect 0 mean ratings), and high bias (expect +5 mean ratings). Three 
experimenters, one from each bias condition, were scheduled to test indi­
vidually 10 subjects each night of the study. The three experimenters 
from each bias condition were scheduled in different time slots over the 
three nights of the study. The experimenters were scheduled 90 minutes 
apart so that there was no overlap between groups; each experimenter took 
about 45 minutes to test his 10 subjects.
The experimenters were read standardized instructions by the 
author before their testing sessions. The instructions were as follows:
You have been asked to assist me in a research project developing a 
test of empathy. I am using different experimenters and subjects to 
approximate real test situations. Your task will consist of showing a 
series of photos of persons to about 10 female subjects from the intro­
duction to psychology class and asking them to rate the photos as to the 
degree of success or failure that the pictured person has been experiencing. 
The subjects differ rather markedly on tested anxiety level and on tested 
self-confidence. These basic personality differences are hypothesized to 
relate to how empathetic the person is— how well he is able to identify 
with others. For example, highly anxious-low self-confidence subjects 
will tend to be generally pessimistic and tend to rate others as experi­
encing relative failure. Low anxiety-high self-confidence subjects are 
thought to generally view others in a more favorable light and consequently 
tend to give ratings of relative success. The pictures are to be shown 
to the subjects in pre-arranged random orders as indicated on the subjects' 
rating sheets. The instructions you are to read to the subjects are self- 
explanatory. Try to put the subjects at ease while reading the instruc­
tions and going over the information at the top of the rating sheet. If
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everything is working as expected your subjects should give average rat­
ings of about (+5, -5, 0). Please do not discuss this project with any­
one until all the subjects are run which will be by this weekend. If 
it gets around what the study is all about, it may contaminate the results.
The only difference in the instructions read was the figure given 
for the average rating expected. The number read to the student experi­
menter was in accordance with which bias condition he represented.
The 10 subjects seen by each experimenter were randomly divided 
into two groups. Five subjects were shown only the 10 high ambiguity 
photos and 5 subjects were shown only the 10 low ambiguity photos. Each 
experimenter tested his 10 subjects in a prearranged random order and 
the 10 photos each subject rated were presented in a prearranged random 
order.
All testing was done in the same one-way mirror observational 
room. The subjects were met in a waiting room across the hall from the 
testing room and ushered into the testing room one at a time by the chief 
investigator. The testing room contained a chair on each side of a small 
table on which was placed the mounted photos in their container. A copy 
of the rating scale to be used was in constant view so that the subjects 
could refer to it during the course of their testing. A copy of this 
rating scale, based on one used by Rosenthal (1966), is contained in 
Appendix A.
The instructions read to the subjects by the experimenters were 
also based on those used by Rosenthal (1966). They were as follows: I 
am going to read you some instructions. I am not permitted to say any­
thing which is not in the instructions nor can I answer any questions
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about this experiment. OK? We are in the process of developing a test 
of empathy. This test is designed to show how well a person is able to 
put himself into someone else's place. I will show you a series of 
photographs. For each one I want you to judge whether the person pictured 
has been experiencing success or failure. To help you make more exact 
judgments you are to use this rating scale. As you can see the scale 
runs from -10 to +10. A rating of -10 means that you judge the person 
to have experienced extreme failure. A rating of +10 means that you 
judge the person to have experienced extreme success. A rating of -1 
means that you judge the person to have experienced mild failure, while 
a rating of +1 means that you judge the person to have experienced mild 
success. You are to rate each photo as accurately as you can. Just 
tell me the rating you assign to each photo in numerical terms— for 
example, -10, +10, +3 or -3. All ready? Here is the first photo.
Each subject carried into the testing room a rating sheet which 
indicated the pictures the experimenter was to present and a place for 
the experimenter to record the ratings given. The upper part of the 
rating sheet asked for routine information such as name, age, major, 
recitation number and instructor, and year in school. These questions 
were answered in the waiting room before the subjects were ushered into 
the testing room.
The experimenters were instructed to not remove the photos com­
pletely from their slots. This speeded up the task as it was faster to 
merely drop the photo back into its slot and it kept the experimenters 
from seeing what picture they were presenting. With the card only partly 
removed from its slot, all the experimenter could see from his side of 
the table was the identifying letter on the back of the mounted photo.
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After testing, the subjects returned to the waiting room and 
were asked to fill-out a short questionnaire. The questionnaire asked 
the following questions: (1) How would you describe the attitude of 
the experimenter? (Cold, Warm, Distant, Calm, Hurried, etc.) (2) What 
do you think was the real purpose of this study? (3) What do you think 
was the average rating expected by your experimenter on a scale -10 
(extreme failure) to +10 (extreme success)? At the bottom of the ques­
tionnaire was an admonition to not discuss the study with others who 
might take part in it.
A confederate of the author was stationed behind the one-way 
mirror at the start of the study to check on the accuracy of the stu­
dent experimenters in recording their ratings. The assistant stationed 
behind the mirror found that it was very difficult to hear the ratings. 
As a result, the information that he recorded may have been less accu­
rate than the ratings as recorded by the student experimenter. On the 
second evening of the study a concealed microphone was tried but still 
the ratings were very difficult to hear behind the one-way mirror. 
Rather than move the microphone nearer to the experimenter and the 
subject, making it obvious that they were being observed, it was 
thought best to discontinue this aspect of the study.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The raw data are contained in Tables 12, 13, and 14 in Appendix 
B. A constant of 10 was added to each rating to convert all ratings to 
positive values for the data analysis.
The first analysis of variance computed was a 3 x 3 x 2 with the 
second factor, experimenters, nested under the first factor, bias con­
dition. The third factor was ambiguity level, the set of photos used 
to elicit the ratings. The dependent variable in this analysis was 
the mean ratings given by the subjects; there were five subjects in 
each of 18 cells. The cell means and standard deviations are contained 
in Table 1. The analysis was carried out using procedures described 
by Winer (1962, pp. 258-263). This overall analysis of the data is 
contained in Table 2.
Two preliminary checks on the data were performed to assess 
the tenability of the assumptions underlying the analysis of variance 
model. To test for homogeneity of variance, a Cochran's JC statistic 
was computed. The observed was .132 with a C of .192 required to 
reject the hypothesis of variance equality at the .05 level where _k, 
the number of cells, is equal to 20. To test whether a data trans­
formation was advisable, a Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient, 
_r, was computed between the cell means and associated cell variances.
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OVERALL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BASED ON THE SUBJECTS' MEAN RATING
TABLE 2
Source df_ MS F P
Bias 2 15.73 4.22 A O
Es within Biases* 6 3.69
Ambiguity 1 326.05 87.41 <.01
Bias x Ambiguity 2 7.72 2.07 NS
Es w. Biases x Ambiguity* 6 2.60
Within Cell* 72 3.82
Pooled Error 84 3.73
Note.— After preliminary checks at the .10 level of signifi­
cance, the starred sources of variance were pooled into a common 
error term.
As can be seen in Table 2, the bias effect was significant beyond 
the .05 level and the ambiguity effect was significant beyond the .01 
level. The interaction of ambiguity and bias, which would show the dif­
ferential effect of bias on low and high ambiguity photos, was not sig­
nificant. Internal analysis of the data showed that there was a sig­
nificant difference between the high bias mean (12.95) and the medium 
bias mean (11.56). The observed jt was 2.80; with 84 degrees of free­
dom, the probability of this Jt occurring by chance is less than .005.
The difference between the low bias mean (12.60) and the medium bias 
mean (11.56) was also significant. The probability of a t this large 
with 84 degrees of freedom is less than .025. The difference between
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the high bias mean and the low bias mean was not statistically signifi 
cant (jt = . 704) .
The second general part of the analysis of the data consisted 
of two 3 x 5  analyses with one repeated measure, designed to get at 
intra-task ambiguity from the experimenters' point of view and the 
detailed relationship of task ambiguity and bias. The same data used 
in the overall analysis of variance above, the subjects’ mean ratings, 
were used in this part of the data analysis but the data were split 
into two parts. The mean ratings from the subjects who were asked to 
rate the ambiguous photos were analyzed separately from the mean rat­
ings of the subjects who rated the unambiguous photos.
For these analyses of variance the mean ratings were ordered 
in the sequence in which the subjects were tested by the experimenters 
The repeated factor was the subject order and the nonrepeated factor 
was the bias condition. The data were analyzed following procedures 
described by Winer (1962, pp. 302-307). The cell means and standard 
deviations are contained in Tables 3 and 4. The data are presented 
graphically in Figures 1 and 2. Summaries of these analyses of vari­
ance are contained in Tables 5 and 6.
As can be seen in Table 5 and Figure 1, the mean ratings of 
the ambiguous photos did not show a significant experimenter bias 
effect. The order effect was significant beyond the .05 level.
Figure 1 shows that this significant subject order effect reflects 




SUMMARY OF THE MEAN RATINGS OF THE UNAMBIGUOUS PHOTOS
Subject Order
Bias 1 2 3 4 5
M 16.36 14.73 15.46 14.10 12.96
Low
SD 2.15 2.43 .83 1.47 1.78
M 14.46 12.66 15.23 14.20 12.56
Medium
SD 1.35 1.26 2.08 .60 3.23
M 14.86 15.13 14.93 13.30 13.13
High
SD 1.75 .30 1.76 1.60 2.54
TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF THE MEAN RATINGS OF THE AMBIGUOUS PHOTOS
Bias 1
Subject Order 
2 3 4 5
M 11.77 11.63 9.46 9.60 9.96
Low
SD 1.59 2.34 1.81 .36 .90
M 10.23 9.90 9.16 9.23 7.93
Medium
SD 1.14 1.34 3.13 3.96 2.13
M 13.06 11.73 9.83 12.33 11.16
High
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE MEAN RATINGS OF THE UNAMBIGUOUS PHOTOS
Source df MS F P
Between
Bias 2 
JEs within Biases 6 
Within
Subject Order 4 
Bias x Order* 8 








Note.— After preliminary checks at the .10 significance level, 
the starred sources of variance were pooled into a common error term.
TABLE 6




Es within Biases 6 
Within
Subject Order 4 
Bias x Order* 8 









Note;— After preliminary checks at the .10 significance level, 
the starred sources of variance were pooled into a common error term.
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Table 6 and Figure 2, based on mean ratings given by subjects 
who viewed the ambiguous photos, reflect a significant experimenter 
bias effect; the subject order effect was not significant. The order 
of the bias levels is not as predicted, hoxi?ever. As can be seen in 
Figure 2, the low bias mean ratings are between the high bias mean 
ratings and the neutral or medium bias mean ratings rather than lower 
than the medium bias mean ratings.
The third general part of the data analysis was an examination 
of the relationship of bias to intra-task ambiguity from the point of 
view of the subjects. This data analysis involved two 3 x 10 analyses 
with the second factor a repeated measure. The second factor repre­
sented the individual ratings of the 10 photos rated by each subject 
in the order presented. The first factor was the three levels of bias. 
The data, as in the second general part of the data analysis, was 
split into two groups. The data from the subjects who rated the 
unambiguous photos were analyzed separately from the data from the 
subjects who rated the ambiguous photos. The cell means and standard 
deviations are given in Tables 7 and 8. These analyses of variance 
are summarized in Tables 9 and 10 and the data are presented graphic­
ally in Figures 3 and 4.
From the numerical analysis of the data from the unambiguous 
photos, contained in Table 9, one can see that there is a significant 
bias x picture order interaction but also a significant picture order 
main effect. The bias main effect was not significant; the IT was only 
.870. The graphic presentation of this data, contained in Figure 3, 
shows that while there is much crossover of the lines representing the
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TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF THE INDIVIDUAL ORDERED RATINGS OF THE UNAMBIGUOUS PHOTOS
Bias 1 2 3
Picture Order 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
M 16.73 15.13 15.00 14.47 15.73 14.60 14.13 14.23 13.53 13.73
Low
SD 2.58 3.66 4.16 4.58 2.40 4.98 3.81 3.41 3.93 5.22
M 13.93 13.13 14.60 14.87 13.33 15.60 13.60 14.33 11.40 13.47
Medium
SD 5.30 5.07 3.83 3.40 4.32 5.01 3.52 2.99 5.05 3.38
M 16.07 15.73 15.80 17.13 14.40 11.87 11.87 13.47 12.87 13.53
High
SD 3.28 3.61 3.34 2.39 2.82 4.32 4.85 5.28 4.31 3.23
TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF THE INDIVIDUAL ORDERED RATINGS OF THE AMBIGUOUS PHOTOS
Picture Order
Bias 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
M 9.13 10.73 10.87 8.93 9.67 10.67 11.00 12.07 8.33 13.27
Low
SD 3.23 4.56 6.22 5.61 4.65 5.65 2.83 4.88 4.48 3.13
M 9.13 10.13 8.40 7.60 9.47 8.33 10.93 7.60 10.07 11.27
Medium
SD 3.98 5.25 5.45 4.44 6.75 6.23 6.20 5.15 5.98 6.80
M 11.87 12.13 11.00 10.73 10.80 9.93 13.20 12.60 12.47 11.53
High
SD 4.53 4.10 3.76 3.95 5.12 3.79 3.95 4.50 4.03 5.30
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TABLE 9
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE ORDERED INDIVIDUAL RATINGS OF THE
UNAMBIGUOUS PHOTOS
Source df MS F P
Between
Bias 2 30.83 .870 NS
Ss within Biases 42 35.56
Within
Picture Order 9 43.41 6.00 <.001
Bias x Picture Order 18 20.68 2.86 <.001
Bias x Ss within Biases 378 7.24 2.86
TABLE 10
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE ORDERED INDIVIDUAL 
AMBIGUOUS PHOTOS
RATINGS OF THE
Source df MS F P
Between
Bias 2 204.17 5.14 <.025
Subjects within Biases 42 39.75
Within
Picture Order 9 37.51 1.68 <.10
Bias x Picture Order* 18 18.63 .83 NS_
Bias x Ss within Biases* 378 22.51
Pooled Error 396 22.32
Note.— After a preliminary check at the .10 level of significance, 
the starred variance sources were pooled into a common error term.
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
PICTURE ORDER
I 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9  10
PICTURE ORDER
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three bias conditions, the general trend of the data is clearly toward 
lower ratings for later rated photos.
The analysis of the ordered ratings of the ambiguous photos, 
contained in Table 10, showed a significant experimenter bias effect 
(jP less than .025) and a picture order effect that approaches sig­
nificance Q? less than .10). The bias x picture order interaction 
was not statistically significant although the graphic presentation 
of the data, Figure 4, shows some crossover of the lines representing 
the three bias conditions. Figure 4 also shows that the ratings 
elicited by the low bias experimenters tended to be intermediate 
between the ratings elicited by the high and medium bias experimen­
ters. The ratings elicited by the high and medium bias experimenters 
tend to be in the predicted order.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
Inter-task Ambiguity
The first experimental hypothesis, that the experimenter bias 
effect is a function of inter-task ambiguity, is supported by the data. 
In both cases where the data from the ambiguous photos were analyzed 
separately from the unambiguous photo ratings, a significant experi­
menter bias effect was found with the ambiguous photos and not found 
with the unambiguous photos. However, this effect was small since the 
interaction reported in Table 2 was not significant. The magnitude 
of the j? statistic for the ambiguity effect was extremely high, 87.41, 
indicating the great difference between the low ambiguity and the high 
ambiguity data.
While the data indicated a statistically significant experi­
menter bias effect, a closer examination of the data indicated that 
the ratings were not in the magnitude order predicted from the experi­
menters' expectancies. The ratings given by the subjects tested by 
the low expectancy experimenters were generally higher than the ratings 
given by the subjects tested by the medium expectancy experimenters. 
This is clearly shown in Figures 2 and 4. The internal analysis of 
the overall analysis of variance reported in Table 2 also showed this 
unpredicted order. The high expectancy and low expectancy means, while 
not significantly different from each other, were both significantly
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larger than the intermediate expectancy mean. A possible explanation 
of this unexpected order is that the task may not have been believable 
to the low expectancy experimenters. The mean overall rating of the 
20 photos was about +3 during the no-expectancy standardization ses­
sions. It may be more believable to an experimenter to be told to 
expect a mean rating of +5 or 0 on these photos than to expect a mean 
rating of -5. An expected mean rating of -5 is just not plausible 
when all of the photos are rated without preconceptions. A second 
group of low ambiguity photos, selected from the extreme low success 
photos, might have had a balancing effect and made the task more 
plausible to the low expectancy experimenters.
There is some evidence against the above explanation of the 
unpredicted rating order. Figure 2, the graphic presentation of the 
mean ratings of the high ambiguity photos, shows that the unpredicted 
order of the,mean ratings was evident with very early subjects as well 
as with later seen subjects. Generally, according to the observers 
stationed behind the one-way mirror, the experimenters did not look at 
the photos before testing the early subjects. Some experimenters did 
look at all of the photos, but only after testing some of their sub­
jects. The anomalous order of the mean ratings, then, was probably a 
function of something brought to the testing situation by the experi­
menters or subjects and not acquired during the testing.
A second possible, but improbable, explanation for the rating 
order is a breakdown in the randomization procedures. It is possible 
that the experimenters randomly selected to be low expectancy experimen­
ters were different in some way from the other six experimenters. For 
some unknown reason they did not communicate their expectancies. A
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strictly random process (drawing names) was followed in assigning the 
experimenters to the bias conditions. It is very unlikely that there 
was any systematic difference between the experimenters introduced as 
a result of the random assignment of the experimenters.
Importance of the Bias Effect
While the experimenter bias effect was found to be statistically 
significant in this study, the amount of variability attributable to the 
bias effect was quite small. The variability attributable to the bias 
effect ranged from 1.2% in the data analysis summarized in Table 9 (the 
bias effect was not statistically significant in that analysis) to a 
high of 24.5% in Table 6, the analysis of the mean ratings of the 
ambiguous photos. According to Rosenthal (1969b), with a sample size 
of about 50 and a median value of .10, expectancy effects, on the 
average, account for only about 5% of the total variance. The median 
variability accounted for by the experimenter bias effect in this study 
was 4.0%; this value came from the data summarized in Table 5. The 
amounts of variability attributable to bias were 3.8% for the data in 
Table 10 and 4.8% for Table 2. Rosenthal stated that these small 
effects are still worth worrying about, however, "because that (5%) 
may be about the average magnitude of variance accounted for in much 
or most behavioral prediction" (1969b, p. 14).
One can question the importance of an effect that typically 
accounts for only about 5% of the total variance. There are many expe­
rimenters, however, where 5% of the variance can make the difference 
between one conclusion and another. Psychologists currently seem to 
have a penchant for arbitrary points for statistical significance,
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e.g., .01. When one holds strongly to some arbitrary level of signifi­
cance for decision making, 5% of the variance can be very important.
Intra-task Ambiguity
The second experimental hypothesis was not supported by the 
data. Where a significant experimenter bias effect was found, it did 
not seem to be differentially related to the experimenters' or the 
subjects' familiarity with the task.
The prediction that the experimenters' increasing familiarity 
with the task would lead to more efficient bias communication with 
later seen subjects was not confirmed by the data. Figure 2, the 
ordered mean ratings of the ambiguous photos, indicates that early 
subject performance is about the same as late subject performance.
The bias effect was not minimal with early subjects and maximal with 
late subjects but maximal with early and late subjects and minimal 
with the intermediate subjects. The experimenters' experience was 
not a relevant variable in this study.
The subject's performance over the course of the task (Figure 
4) appeared to be relatively independent of their familiarity with 
the task. The prediction that the subjects' ratings would become more 
independent of the experimenters' biases with increasing familiarity 
with the task was not supported by the data. The findings of Weick 
(Rosenthal, 1966) and Rosenthal et al., (1964) were not corroborated 
by this study. The data pertaining to the subjects' performance over 
the course of the 10 photos each rated showed great variability; this
made it difficult to state any clear conclusions.
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The ratings of the unambiguous photos, while not showing a 
significant experimenter bias effect, showed a relationship between 
the subjects' and experimenters' familiarity with the task and the 
ratings given. Both analyses of variance that were based on the rat­
ings of the unambiguous photos, summarized in Tables 5 and 9, showed 
a significant order effect. The analysis summarized in Table 9 also 
showed a significant bias x picture order interaction, however. The 
graphic presentation of the data, Figures 1 and 3, show clearly that 
the general trend of the data is toward lower ratings with increasing 
familiarity both from the experimenters' point of view, Figure 1, and 
the subjects' point of view, Figure 3. The early ratings depicted in 
Figures 1 and 3 were not much different from the mean ratings under the 
no-expectancy standardization condition. In Figure 1 the mean rating 
of the first subjects was 15.27; the mean rating of the last seen sub­
jects was 12.88. In Figure 3 the mean rating of the first photo was 
15.58, of the last photo, 13.58.
The trends were probably artifactual and not dependent upon 
familiarity or decreasing ambiguity. One possible reason why the later 
tested subjects rated lower on the unambiguous photos was that they had 
to wait longer before their testing sessions. When drawing for subject 
order in the presence of the subjects, the author observed that subjects 
who did not have to wait, the early drawn ones, were quite happy. They 
were getting experimental credit for a relatively short time investment. 
The task may have been more negative for subjects who had to wait for up 
to 45 minutes to be tested. This possible growing impatience with the 
whole situation could conceivably have lead to later lower ratings.
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The ratings of the ambiguous photos in relation to subject 
order, Table 6, Figure 2, also showed some tendency for longer-wait 
subjects to rate lower. The first-subject mean was 11.68 while the 
fifth-subject mean was 9.68. The tendency toward lowered later sub­
ject ratings was not as strong as with the unambiguous photos. The 
order effect, Table 6, was not statistically significant (P_ less than 
.25) as it had been with the unambiguous photos CP less than .05),
Table 5.
The trends of the ratings ordered by picture order, Figures 3 
and 4, were quite different from the trends of the ratings ordered by 
subject order, Figures 1 and 2. Where the subject-ordered ratings show 
a roughly parallel decline, the picture-ordered ratings of the unambig­
uous and ambiguous photos show a tendency toward convergence. The 
picture-ordered ratings of the unambiguous photos had a mean of 15.58 
for the first photo and 13.58 for the tenth photo so there was a tend­
ency for later pictures to be rated lower than earlier pictures as 
stated earlier. The order effect was significant (F=6.00, P_ less than 
.001) but also the bias x picture order interaction (F=2.86, P_ less than 
.001) as Table 9 indicates. The picture ordered ratings of the ambig­
uous photos (Figure 4) had a mean of 10.04 for the first photo and 12.02 
for the tenth photo; the general trend of the ratings seems to be toward 
higher ratings for later rated photos. The picture-order effect for the 
ambiguous photos approached but did not achieve statistical significance 
(F=1.70, 1? less than .10) as indicated by Table 10.
What appears to have happened is that the subjects over the 
course of the 10 photos each rated retreated to ratings of higher social 
desirability. For the unambiguous photos the subjects started rating
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high, as expected, but retreated to lower ratings later. The ambiguous 
photos were initially rated as being not successful and not unsuccessful 
as in the no-expectancy situation; they tended to be rated as mildly 
successful later. While it is probably very acceptable to say someone 
is mildly successful, it is somewhat less acceptable to say someone is 
very successful or not successful and not unsuccessful. Objectively, 
the photos probably would have to be rated more as the subjects did on 
the first photos they rated.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Previous research and discussion has suggested that task ambigu­
ity and experimenter-subject familiarity with the task are important 
factors affecting the generality and strength of the experimenter bias 
effect. These factors were conceptualized as inter-task ambiguity 
(inherent in the task) and two types of intra-task ambiguity (experi­
menter's familiarity with the task and subject's familiarity with the 
task). It was hypothesized that experimenter bias would: (1) be a 
significant factor in a more ambiguous task and not a significant factor 
in a less ambiguous task, (2) more likely be communicated to the sub­
jects who were less familiar with the task, and (3) more likely be com­
municated to the subjects as the experimenters became more familiar 
with the task.
Nine upperclassmen experimenters were randomly assigned to one 
of three bias level, high, medium, and low (expect +5, 0, or -5 mean 
ratings on the person perception task). Each experimenter tested 10 
subjects (female volunteers from introductory psychology) in a random 
order. Five subjects rated high ambiguity photos (mean ratings near 
0 on the success-failure dimension under a no-expectancy condition) 
and five viewed low ambiguity photos (mean ratings high in the success 
direction under the no-expectancy condition).
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Five analyses of variance were computed; a significant experi­
menter bias effect was found with the high ambiguity stimulus photos 
but not with the low ambiguity photos. However, the bias levels were 
not communicated in the predicted order. The high and low expectancy 
experimenters were both significantly higher than the medium bias experi­
menters. The hypotheses pertaining to intra-task ambiguity were not 
supported by the data.
From this study one can conclude that the experimenter bias 
effect is a function of ambiguity inherent in the task. The role of 
intra-task ambiguity is less clear and no conclusion can be stated 
based on the present data.
Extreme Moderate Mild Mild Moderate
Failure Failure Failure Success Success





MEAN RATINGS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE PHOTOS 
UNDER THE NO-EXPECTANCY CONDITION
TABLE 11
High Ambiguity Photos Low Ambiguity Photos
M SD M SD
+.4 4.6 +6.9 1.8
-.7 3.8 +6.1 4.0
-.6 3.2 +6.3 5.1
-.6 3.9 +7.2 2.5
-.9 4.8 +6.1 3.6
+ .4 4.2 +7.5 2.0
+• 8 4.5 +6.3 4.8
+ .9 5.0 +6.1 3.9
-.8 4.3 +7.6 2.2
0 4.6 +8.2 1.7
62
TABLE 12
RAW SCORES FOR THE LOW EXPECTANCY EXPERIMENTERS
E .S 1 2
Ambiguous Photos 
Photo Order 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ŝ 1 2
Unambiguous Photos 
Photo Order 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 6 9 14 11 11 19 11 16 5 8 2 17 15 19 13 20 20 17 12 20 20
3 7 9 11 14 4 1 12 8 18 15 4 14 12 14 9 17 6 9 18 9 13
3 5 6 17 5 18 11 18 7 8 6 12 6 20 16 17 12 18 18 17 14 12 15
7 14 5 3 0 15 12 9 16 3 18 8 18 16 19 20 18 15 12 9 16 15
10 8 11 15 13 7 3 8 14 8 12 9 17 15 19 7 14 19 5 20 13 11
5 11 12 13 6 5 8 12 16 12 12 1 12 19 13 14 18 16 11 11 14 11
6 17 2 19 7 0 13 15 9 9 16 2 19 20 15 19 14 20 18 20 7 17
4 8 5 13 16 2 8 5 12 17 8 13 3 17 6 16 20 15 13 14 15 11 18
9 11 14 9 0 13 7 9 9 15 13 4 13 18 7 8 14 13 14 16 14 14
10 8 11 18 13 12 12 14 8 5 8 7 17 11 5 18 14 7 13 16 8 0
3 9 19 14 6 16 15 16 20 3 18 1 20 18 18 19 16 20 18 15 16 19
5 11 13 18 14 9 18 14 15 14 17 2 17 19 14 20 16 19 19 11 11 7
8 8 8 4 1 7 8 11 9 9 6 11 4 13 14 18 12 18 15 17 15 19 19
9 7 11 3 15 9 5 9 13 7 14 6 18 15 15 12 12 7 14 11 15 15
10 9 11 4 8 17 13 8 3 6 12 7 19 13 16 14 12 11 14 11 18 12
Note.— A constant of 10 was added to each rating.
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TABLE 13
RAW SCORES FOR THE MEDIUM EXPECTANCY EXPERIMENTERS
E Ŝ 1 2
Ambiguous Photos 
Photo Order 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2
Unambiguous Photos 
Photo Order 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 13 12 7 6 5 14 4 18 17 18 3 3 13 17 15 15 15 13 7 20 11
2 7 5 13 17 13 19 11 8 12 5 4 11 8 12 15 16 20 12 12 11 12
2 6 13 18 4 6 20 3 8 13 15 0 5 19 18 16 12 7 12 16 17 16 15
8 9 15 0 4 1 2 1 3 0 20 7 8 20 11 15 11 20 11 12 18 13
10 9 0 5 8 5 12 9 8 2 9 9 12 16 7 9 3 0 5 17 2 19
1 5 8 14 7 4 3 14 1 19 16 4 16 14 18 18 17 16 12 17 11 12
2 8 9 4 11 17 1 18 13 5 17 5 20 15 15 9 16 16 11 14 11 11
6 3 14 8 6 3 5 2 2 2 11 4 6 19 20 18 14 17 20 19 16 16 16
7 14 7 17 14 12 16 13 12 13 16 8 11 3 14 17 12 18 13 20 12 18
9 4 14 19 1 8 3 19 2 16 18 10 18 17 19 15 12 18 18 14 11 11
2 15 11 3 8 17 6 19 5 2 16 1 7 8 15 20 20 20 17 15 12 19
4 6 2 8 7 13 15 5 8 11 9 3 11 8 8 13 11 14 16 13 7 12
7 5 6 17 12 12 19 5 16 2 14 15 7 17 13 16 13 15 14 16 14 2 14
6 11 14 6 8 2 15 8 12 9 3 9 19 8 20 20 16 16 13 14 11 12
8 3 12 8 2 1 9 17 7 5 3 10 18 15 13 18 12 15 12 13 11 7
Note.— A constant of 10 was added to each rating.
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TABLE 14
RAW SCORES FOR THE HIGH EXPECTANCY EXPERIMENTERS
E S 1 2
Ambiguous Photos 
Photo Order 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 S. 1 2
Unambiguous Photos 
Photo Order 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 12 13 9 8 12 16 14 14 12 18 3 13 13 14 18 15 8 6 20 12 13
2 11 9 13 6 8 5 12 14 12 13 4 19 18 15 20 18 7 18 5 13 15
1 6 8 11 8 5 16 7 11 12 13 5 5 15 20 20 14 11 19 18 15 12 14
7 13 11 17 12 8 13 11 13 14 7 8 14 18 15 18 18 13 11 15 15 13
10 18 19 15 7 19 6 6 16 17 18 9 17 18 15 20 15 12 14 17 14 15
1 13 15 12 18 6 12 18 15 9 18 2 20 17 9 15 17 12 9 17 17 14
4 14 12 12 15 13 15 11 17 8 16 3 15 18 15 20 13 14 15 15 12 15
5 6 7 2 9 13 11 13 12 20 19 1 5 14 17 19 14 14 15 20 19 12 17
9 20 15 11 11 20 15 17 15 12 15 7 20 12 11 17 12 9 11 11 7 8
10 11 14 8 9 12 8 9 14 7 11 8 8 20 20 15 13 7 4 3 7 9
1 18 12 16 9 13 7 17 14 16 6 2 18 18 18 18 13 20 12 16 20 14
3 5 18 11 7 9 11 20 3 18 14 4 17 8 18 19 20 15 15 8 14 20
9 7 7 11 2 13 5 6 18 8 15 7 5 14 11 20 17 15 11 6 19 5 11
8 14 12 9 11 9 7 11 8 8 11 6 20 16 15 13 11 5 7 8 20 16
9 7 8 13 17 1 8 11 6 7 13 10 17 12 13 19 11 11 12 14 13 9
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